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Torts and Workmen's Compensation
TORTS*
Richard V. Campbell**
LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT
Modern common law emphasizes the fault requirement in tort
actions. Some scholars feel that it is more fictitious than real,
but they agree that it is orthodox. Logic may dictate that liabil-
ity without fault should be completely eliminated from the com-
mon law; that the fault requirement is sufficiently flexible to
administer all cases. This has not happened. Liability without
fault exists in various areas of tort, both by common law and by
legislation. If there is any trend, it is one of expansion of the
areas, not one of contraction.
The basic question was presented to the Louisiana Supreme
Court in 1944 in an oil well "blow out" case.1 The case was strik-
ingly like the California record in Green v. General Petroleum
Corporation.2 It was held that fault had been established, that
the defendant was liable in negligence under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.3 The issue of strict liability was shelved as an
interesting academic question.
The problem was raised again recently in Fontenot v. Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co.4 The action was for damages to residences
alleged to have resulted from the negligence of the defendants
in the use of explosives while conducting geophysical observa-
*Four cases decided during the period under review are not discussed: (1)
O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 227 La. 262, 79 So.2d 87 (1955), was an action for false
arrest and confinement. The main legal problem was the power of the coroner of
the Parish of Orleans. (2) Norman v. State, 227 La. 904, 80 So.2d 858 (1955),
was a suit for personal injuries caused when a wooden bridge collapsed under the
weight of a heavily loaded truck. The accident happened on a secondary road. It
was held that a fact question was decisive-did the Department of Highways
place and maintain a load limit sign in a proper place to warn the driver of the
truck? (3) A deliberate trespass was involved in Brantley v. Tremont & Gulf Ry.,
226 La. 176, 75 So.2d 236 (1954). An attempted justification of the act was un-
successful. (4) The principal problems in Magee v. Texas Construction Co., 227
La. 32, 78 So.2d 500 (1955) concerned adequacy of damages and procedural mat-
ters.
**Visiting Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Watkins v. Gulf Refining Co., 206 La. 942, 20 So.2d 273 (1944).
2. 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928).
3. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1944-1945 Term-
Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 601 (1946).
4. 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845 (1955).
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tions in the vicinity. An alternative count was included on lia-
bility irrespective of fault. The trial judge ruled for the defend-
ants. A question of fact which was vital under either theory of
law was in dispute. The damage in the case consisted mainly of
cracks in walls and ceilings. The plaintiffs contended that this
damage was caused by vibrations and concussions resulting from
the activities of the defendants. The defendants countered with
the argument that the damage could not have been caused by
their conduct; that it must have been caused by natural earth
settlement, or use of inferior materials or poor workmanship in
the construction of the buildings. The Supreme Court decided
that the damage had been caused by the acts of the defendants.
This formed the background for the law question of the na-
ture of the defendants' responsibility. It was held that the rule
of absolute liability is applicable to a situation of this nature.
The result is satisfactory, but the theory announced in reaching
it is disturbing. The court stated that its conclusion was not
founded on Louisiana tort law; that it was an obligation imposed
on property owners by the Civil Code. Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.
R.R.,5 decided in 1947, was stressed as authority for the rule.6
Let us analyze this explanation.
The real problem is which party should bear the loss in cases
of this nature, assuming that both are free from fault. The issue
is not changed by the label given. The property theory drawn
from the Code deals only with property owners in relation to
other property owners. In this limited form, it inevitably leads
to a distortion of values. Property interests are given greater
protection than personality interests. Thus, in an activity of the
kind involved here, if a person is injured while walking along
the public street, he must prove negligence. If the walls of ad-
jacent property suffer, the defendant is liable irrespective of
negligence. This is not sound policy. It is justified only if the
court really feels that it is powerless to impose liability without
fault in tort. It may be urged then that half a loaf is better than
none. Common law courts have not hesitated to depart from the
5. 211 La. 729, 30 So.2d 816 (1947).
6. This case is discussed in an earlier issue of the Law Review. See The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term- Property, 8 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 234, 236 (1948); The Work of the Louisiana Supremel Court for
the 1946-1947 Term -Torts and Workmen's Conmpensation, 8 LOUISIANA LAW
IlEVIEW 248 (1948).
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fault requirement in tort actions in proper cases. 7 Is the Civil
Code more restrictive on the courts of Louisiana ?"
The decision itself indicates that tort theory is needed. The
Devoke case9 apparently requires a property interest by the de-
fendant as a foundation for the servitude. It rests on the pro-
vision of the Civil Code dealing with a proprietor and his neigh-
bors. Where is the property interest in the Fontenot case?1o The
opinion is silent on the subject. The defendants had at most a
bare license to conduct their experiments in the vicinity. In fact,
in the case of one of the plaintiffs, the defendants were on his
land with his permission.
NEGLIGENCE
Res Ipsa Loquitur
The policies surrounding the use of res ipsa loquitur doctrine
are unnecessarily complicated by the phrase itself. When does
the "thing" speak for itself and what does it say? These prob-
lems were presented in Northwestern Mutual Fire Association v.
Allain.11 0 owned a frame building which was damaged by fire.
P insurance company paid 0 for the fire loss and sued D1 and
D2 for the sum paid. D1 had entered into a contract with 0 to
paint the building. D1 employed D2 to assist in the performance
of the contract. While two workmen of D2 were using a blow-
torch to remove paint from the house, it caught fire. The fire
was not extinguished until the fire department reached the
premises. In deciding whether res ipsa loquitur spoke in this
case, the Supreme Court outlined the requirements in Louisiana.
It must appear that:
(1) "[T]he accident which damaged plaintiff was caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the actual or constructive
control of the defendant,"
(2) "[T] he accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of negligence," and
7. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 519-24 (1938).
8. For an analysis of this question, see Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The
Concept of Fault, 27 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1952).
9. Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So.2d 816 (1947).
10. For a detailed discussion of the case from the aspect of property law, see
page 227 supra.
11. 226 La. 788, 77 So.2d 395 (1954).
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(3) "[E]vidence as to the true explanation of the accident is
more readily accessible to the defendant than to the plain-
tiff."12
The courts in this country generally agree on the first two re-
quirements quoted above. The wording may differ somewhat in
detail, but there is slight relation between these linguistic differ-
ences and the content of the rule of individual courts. The third
proposition stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court is more
doubtful. In view of the nature of res ipsa loquitur cases, it fre-
quently happens that the defendant is in a better position to ex-
plain the facts than the plaintiff. However, few courts adhere
to a rigid requirement of this kind. The court's analysis of the
evidence in the instant case led it to conclude that the doctrine
was available to the plaintiff.
The next question is what does the doctrine say. Does it point
an accusing finger at the defendant and cry out in a loud voice
or is it a weak assertion? The Louisiana Supreme Court has been
vague about the exact meaning of res ipsa loquitur. In this one
opinion it speaks of it as "a rule of evidence," "a prima facie
case of negligence on the part of the defendant," "the burden
... on the defendant to show absence of negligence on his part,"
and an "inference of negligence." It may be that the exact effect
is not too important under Louisiana procedure. 13 In any event,
the instant case emphasizes the distinctive feature of the doc-
trine- its value as an inference even after substantial evidence
has been introduced by the defendant tending to show that he
took all care reasonably required. The employees who removed
the paint in the instant case stated that they followed each of the
customary precautions outlined by the experts. The court con-
cluded that the inference raised from the circumstances of the
accident remained to contradict their evidence. This is the strong
voice of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The decision on this point
here may have been weakened by the additional conclusion that
the testimony of the workmen failed to show satisfactory prep-
aration for extinguishing a fire. Nevertheless, it seems clear that
the court is recognizing the full strength of the inference urged
12. Id. at 793, 77 So.2d at 397.
13. See Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference - A Discussion of
the Louisiana Cases, 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 70 (1941).
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so forcefully in Dean Prosser's writings on this subject. The
opinion quotes at length from his book on torts. 14
The requirement of control by the defendant is obviously de-
signed to fix responsibility on this particular party. The facts
may demonstrate that someone was negligent. This is not
enough. That someone must be this defendant. This feature is
vital but should not be pressed to absurd extremes. Control may
be sufficient to prove the defendant's negligence although the
situation includes collateral negligence by others. One item of the
control requirement is clear. It must appear that the defend-
ant's conduct was a cause of the plaintiff's damage. Two recent
cases are excellent examples. Res ipsa loquitur failed in each case
because the plaintiff was unable to convince the court of this
factual connection.
In one of these cases, the action was against a railroad for
damages caused by fire near its tracks.15 Judgment was for the
defendant below. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had
failed to meet his burden of showing, either by direct evidence or
inference, that the fire was caused by a passing train or other
instrumentality of the defendant. In the other case, the defend-
ant operated a machine to break up concrete on a highway.16 The
plaintiff claimed that this cracked the walls of his home. The
judgment below again was in favor of the defendant. The Su-
preme Court affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
prove that the damage to his house was caused by the operation
of the machine.
Effect of Emergency
The "emergency rule" is a familiar one throughout the coun-
try. In statement it frequently sounds like it excuses negligence.
A recent Louisiana case, Commercial Standard Insurance Co.. v.
Johnson, 7 is typical. Of course, emergency is vital in the admin-
istration of standards of due care. It should be given weight as
should all other significant facts. However, it does not excuse
negligence; rather it illustrates the nature of negligence. The
problem is never one of sitting in an armchair after the event
14. Specifically, PROSSER, Torts 291, 309 (1941).
15. Pearson v. Louisiana & Arkansas Ry., 226 La. 834, 77 So.2d 411 (1954).
16. Tadin v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 226 La. 629, 76 So.2d 910
(1954).
17. 82 So.2d 8 (La. 1955).
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and determining what should have been done. Negligence- de-
pends on the situation as it existed at the time of action. A ,party
is not required by the law of negligence to make the right choice.
It is sufficient if his choice is a reasonable one under the circum-
stances as they appeared when he acted.
The "emergency rule" problem is not as serious in Louisiana
as in the other states where the jury system prevails. It is un-
likely that the judges will be misled by the awkward wording of
the rule. Where a jury must be instructed, a substantial practical
problem is presented.
It is agreed that the rule does not apply where the emergency
faced by a party is the result of his own negligence. The label
for the rule fully demonstrates that it is inapplicable where there
is no emergency. This was the basis for the decision in the in-
stant case.
Range of Vision Rule
The "drive within-the radius of your lights" rule has been
announced in a number of Louisiana cases. It means that atten-
tion is concentrated on a single fact. Did the party in motion hit
the stationary or slow moving object? If he did, he is automatic-
ally negligent. A literal use of this idea produces an unwarranted
inflexibility in the application of standards of due care to the
operation of motor vehicles at night under modern traffic condi-
tions. In several Supreme Court opinions the emphasis has shift-
ed to all the facts and circumstances of the case.18 Thus, where
one party is illegally parked on the highway without proper
lights, the other party has been allowed to recover although he
failed to stop within the radius of his headlights. 19 This result
undoubtedly reflects dissatisfaction with the contributory negli-
gence bar rule, but it has not been accomplished by creating
another exception to that rule. The plaintiff has been completely
exonerated of negligence. It seems likely that in time, cases of
this nature will completely undermine the announced rule. How-
ever, a recent decision illustrates that the doctrine still has some
vitality.20 The action was for the value of cattle killed by a bus.
18. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1948-1949 Term -
Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 10 LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW 188, 192 (1950).
19. Dodge v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 214 La. 1031, 39 So.2d 720 (1949);
Gaiennie v. Cooperative Produce Co., 196 La. 417, 199 So. 377 (1940).
20. Geoghegan v. Greyhound Corp., 226 La. 405, 76 So.2d 412 (1954).
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The bus driver was traveling forty-five miles per hour on a wet
road in a mist which restricted his visibility. The animals
"walked" or "stalked" onto the highway in front of the bus. The
district court found for the plaintiff. The court of appeal re-
versed, but the Supreme Court reinstated the judgment of the
trial court.21 The announced ground for the decision was that a
driver of an automobile is guilty of negligence in driving at a
rate of speed greater than that in which he is able to stop within
the range of his vision.
Traffic Regulations
Driving on the right. In Anthony Bass Lumber Co. v. Mar-
quette Casualty Co.22 two trucks were approaching each other
when D's truck commenced to skid and swerved across the cen-
ter line into the traffic lane occupied by P. D urged that he was
without fault because he lost control when forced to apply the
brakes on the wet highway to avoid striking a third truck which
suddenly emerged from a stationary position in front of D's
truck. The opinion indicated that when D invaded the left side of
the highway, the usual burden of proof shifted; that D was now
obliged to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
he was blameless. Under D's version of the facts, he was suc-
cessful. People in the parked truck had a different view of the
facts which was not favorable to D. The trial judge was im-
pressed by the testimony of D's driver and found in his favor.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
Courts may use different words to describe the law in a case
of this nature, but the net result is substantially the same. Some
jurisdictions would say that the statute was violated and that D
was negligent per se or at least prima facie negligent. In either
event, they would allow him to offer the excuse of no actual fault.
If he was able to prove that he was blameless, as he did here,
judgment would be given in his favor.
Davis v. Lewis & Lewis23 involved a case where a driver in-
vaded the left side of the highway without excuse. This happened
at a curve and the court was convinced that he was not watching
21. This accident happened in 1951 and did not involve the effect of the new
stock law on the rights of an owner of cattle against the operator of a motor
vehicle. LA. R.S. 3:2801 et seq. (Supp. 1954).
22. 227 La. 339, 79 So.2d 330 (1955).
23. 226 La. 1064, 78 So.2d 174 (1954).
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the road ahead of him. The main problem was the responsibility
of the driver on the right. In cases of this nature he is in an
extreme emergency due to no fault of his own. Whatever move
he makes may be wrong. The law should be tolerant with a per-
son in this dilemma. In the instant case the trial judge decided
in favor of the driver on the right, the plaintiff in the litigation.
The court of appeal reversed on the ground that he was guilty of
contributory negligence, one judge dissenting. The Supreme
Court agreed with the trial judge and reinstated the judgment
for the plaintiff.
Right of way. Booth v. Columbia Casualty Co.24 involved a
collision at an intersection between vehicles approaching at right
angles. P was in the intersection first, going about seven miles
per hour, and D approached from P's right at approximately
twenty miles per hour. The court in ruling in favor of P on the
ground that he had preempted the intersection said that "under
the well-settled jurisprudence the automobile which first enters
an intersection has the right of way over an approaching auto-
mobile and the driver who does not respect this legal right of the
automobile which first entered the intersection to proceed
through in safety, is negligent, even though the car thereafter
entering the intersection is being driven on a right of way
street. '25 This bare statement sounds like an invitation to evil,
but undoubtedly such is not the case. It seems clear that preemp-
tion is not established by beating a fellow motorist to the intersec-
tion. The courts of appeal now generally agree that the doctrine is
qualified by a requirement that the entrance must be made with
the reasonable expectation of clearing the intersection without
obstructing others.26 In the Booth case, the intersection was a
blind one. The briefs indicate that there were no traffic signal
controls and that both streets were two-way streets. The opin-
ion of the court would have been more satisfactory if it had ex-
pressly limited its broad statement of the preemption doctrine.
However, it seems proper to assume that the court was convinced
that P took all reasonable precautions feasible before entering
the intersection.
It may be urged that the preemption rule is a misfit in the
present day with its statutory controls on right of way. In any
24. 227 La. 932, 80 So.2d 869 (1955).
25. Id. at 935, 80 So.2d at 870.
26. Harris v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 70 So.2d 235 (La. App. 1954).
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event, it is clear that a person should never secure the right of
way solely because he reaches the intersection first.
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
The rule granting immunity of governmental units from lia-
bility for the torts of their agents or servants where performing
in a governmental capacity, a rule much criticized by many mem-
bers of the legal profession, was reaffirmed by the court in Bar-
ber Laboratories, Inc. v. New Orleans,27 a suit against the city
for alleged negligence of its fire department employees in ex-
tinguishing a fire on the plaintiff's premises. Because the case
deals with local governmental responsibility in tort it is treated
elsewhere in this Symposium. 28
RIGHT-OF PRIVACY
Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. 29 was an un-
usual case on the right of privacy. P had a liability insurance
policy written by D. P became involved in a serious automobile
accident. D, as his insurer, investigated the matter and was later
sued by third persons injured in the accident for the sum of over
$100,000. P was hospitalized for some time, and he was unable
to give D any information about the accident. D finally published
a statement in a New Orleans paper which was signed with P's
name. This publication stated that P would like to see anyone
who had witnessed the accident. The address listed under P's
name was that of an employee of D. This entire plan was han-
dled without the knowledge or consent of P. He claimed damages
for physical pain and suffering, humiliation, and invasion of his
right of privacy. Trial was held before a jury and judgment re-
turned in the sum of $12,500. D appealed to the Supreme Court.
It was held that the case was not within the jurisdiction of that
court on an appeal because suits for damages for physical in-
juries to a person or for other damages sustained by such person
arising out of the same circumstances are excepted from such
jurisdiction. It was held that all the damages claimed here, in-
cluding those for physical pain and suffering, arose out of the
same circumstances. The case was transferred to the appropriate
27. 227 La. 104, 78 So.2d 525 (1955).
28. See page 316 infra.
29. 226 La. 644, 76 So.2d 916 (1954).
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court of appeal which ruled that P had a good cause of action.80
It felt that D's acts could not be justified although it did recog-
nize mitigating circumstances and consequently reduced the dam-
ages to $3,000. One judge felt that an award of $500 would have
been ample.
MASTER AND SERVANT
Amyx v. Henry & Hall31 involved the distinction between an
independent contractor and an employee. The general tests for
deciding this problem are well settled. Disagreement is in the
application of the tests to the facts of particular cases. The in-
stant case is a good example. X owned a truck jointly with Y,
and used it in all sorts of jobs. On hearing that D needed truck
haulers, X went to the gravel pit of D and offered his truck and
services at two dollars per cubic yard, oil and gas to be paid by
him. There was no agreement as to how much he would haul.
Thirty or forty other truck drivers operated their own trucks for
D under the same conditions. Loading was by D's equipment and
D's foreman supervised the loading as to both quality and quan-
tity. Either party could terminate the relationship at his pleas-
ure.
The trial court found that X was not an independent con-
tractor but that he was employee of D. This finding was re-
versed by the court of appeal,32 one judge dissenting. The Su-
preme Court reversed the court of appeal,33 ruling that the trial
judge was correct, one justice dissenting.
B & G Crane Service, Inc. v. Thomas W. Hooley & Sons3 4 is
another situation where broad general principles of law are well
settled. The case involved the question of responsibility for the
acts of an operator furnished with a leased machine. Which of
the two masters is liable? It was held that under the facts of this
case the operator was the servant of the lessee.
30. Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 82 So.2d 61 (La. App.
1955).
31. 227 La. 364, 79 So.2d 483 (1955).
32. Amyx v. Henry & Hall, 69 So.2d 69 (La. App. 1953).
33. 227 La. 364, 79 So.2d 483 (1955).
34. 227 La. 677, 80 So.2d 369 (1955).
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